Vulnerability database
Every flaw the U.S. government’s cybersecurity agency (CISA) has confirmed attackers are using, plus the new WordPress plugin and theme bugs published each day, sorted by what they mean for a small business. We refresh it twice a day. If you see something your website or office runs, tell us.
20 results
Oct 7, 2026PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-62179 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubMedium 6.5
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In `praisonai-platform` prior to version 0.1.9, issue dependency deletion can be authorized against the wrong side of a dependency edge. A workspace member cannot delete a dependency through the owner-created issue endpoint, but can delete the same dependency through a member-owned related issue endpoint because the route accepts either endpoint and checks delete permission only against the caller-selected URL issue. Version 0.1.9 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Aug 7, 2026PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-48169 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.8
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API have two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any workspace just by swapping UUIDs in their API requests. On top of that, every member management endpoint (add, update role, remove) only requires `min_role="member"`, which lets any workspace member promote themselves to owner and kick out the original owner. A low-privilege member of one workspace can steal data from every other workspace and take over any workspace they belong to. Both issues come from the same gap: the route layer pulls `workspace_id` from the URL and verifies membership, but the service layer ignores the workspace scope for resource lookups and ignores the caller's role level for member operations. The `require_workspace_member()` dependency does its job correctly. The problem is that the service layer doesn't use the information it provides. Version 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API patch the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47419 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.3
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an* Insecure Direct Object Reference. The agent CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `agent_id` through `AgentService.get(agent_id)` which is a primary-key lookup with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, or delete agents that belong to a different workspace `W2` by guessing or harvesting an agent UUID and calling `…/workspaces/W1/agents/<W2-agent-id>`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47418 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.1
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47417 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.1
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The comment endpoints (`POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/comments` and `GET .../comments`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then call `CommentService.create(issue_id=issue_id, ...)` and `CommentService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` without verifying that `issue_id` belongs to `workspace_id`. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read every comment on, and post new comments to, any issue in any other workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47416 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubCritical 9.6
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 are vulnerable to vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role="member"` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member's role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller's own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47415 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.3
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The issue CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `issue_id` through `IssueService.get(issue_id)` which is a primary-key lookup with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, or delete issues that belong to a different workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47414 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 7.6
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. Five label endpoints — `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `DELETE .../labels/{label_id}`, `POST .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `DELETE .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `GET .../issues/{issue_id}/labels` — gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only and pass URL-supplied `label_id` and `issue_id` straight through to `LabelService` without verifying either belongs to the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47413 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubCritical 9.6
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have aprivilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`) and forwards the request body's `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47412 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.1
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47411 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubMedium 6.5
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace's `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47410 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubCritical 9.8
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47409 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.1
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47408 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubMedium 6.5
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The `GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` and dispatches to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)`, which executes `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47407 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubCritical 9.4
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource's own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL's `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role="member"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47406 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.1
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The dependency endpoints (`POST/GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies` and `DELETE .../dependencies/{dep_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then dispatch to `DependencyService` calls that take URL/body-supplied issue and dependency IDs without verifying any of them belong to the membership-checked workspace. Most damaging: `create_dependency` accepts `body.depends_on_issue_id` from the request body — that ID is checked against nothing — letting an attacker create a "blocks" or "related" link between any two issues anywhere in the database. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47405 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.8
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`. The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role="member"`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members. As a result, a normal workspace member can promote their own account from `member` to `owner`; add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`; change other members' roles; remove legitimate owners or members; take over workspace membership completely; and/or perform destructive workspace operations after escalation. This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 21, 2026PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system.CVE-2026-47399 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by GitHubHigh 8.8
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object's global UUID. The affected pattern appears in workspace-scoped routes such as agents, projects, issues, and comments. The route layer verifies that the caller is a member of the `workspace_id` provided in the URL, but the service layer later resolves the target object by global object ID only. It does not verify that the resolved object actually belongs to the workspace in the URL. As a result, a valid member of `workspace_attacker` can call a route under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/...` while supplying an object UUID from `workspace_victim`. The server authorizes the request based on membership in `workspace_attacker`, then fetches or mutates the victim object by global UUID. This breaks the platform's workspace isolation boundary. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
- Product
- praisonai-platform
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 11, 2026PraisonAI Platform (praisonai-platform) before 0.1.9 fails to enforce owner/admin authorization on the PATCH routes for projects, issues, and agents, which onlyCVE-2026-61442 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by VulnCheckHigh 7.1
PraisonAI Platform (praisonai-platform) before 0.1.9 fails to enforce owner/admin authorization on the PATCH routes for projects, issues, and agents, which only require workspace-member role. A workspace member can modify owner-created records; for projects, a member can reassign lead_id to their own user id and then delete the owner-created project, bypassing the delete route's owner/admin permission check.
- Product
- PraisonAI
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Jul 10, 2026PraisonAI Platform (praisonai-platform) before 0.1.9 improperly authorizes deletion of issue dependencies.CVE-2026-61441 · Other software · MervinPraison · reported by VulnCheckHigh 7.1
PraisonAI Platform (praisonai-platform) before 0.1.9 improperly authorizes deletion of issue dependencies. The DELETE dependency route accepts either endpoint of a dependency edge and checks delete permission only against the caller-selected URL issue. A workspace member who cannot delete a dependency through an owner-created issue endpoint (which returns 403) can delete the same dependency edge by targeting a related member-owned issue endpoint, because permission is validated against the member-owned issue's owner. This allows members to bypass owner/admin authorization and remove owner-created issue dependencies.
- Product
- PraisonAI
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.
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