Vulnerability database

4 results

• Aug 21, 2026A parser state isolation vulnerability in misp-stix could cause data from a previously processed STIX document to be retained and incorporated into the MISP eveCVE-2026-77761 · Other software · misp · reported by 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8Medium 6.3

  A parser state isolation vulnerability in misp-stix could cause data from a previously processed STIX document to be retained and incorporated into the MISP event generated from a subsequent document when the same parser instance is reused. Several STIX 1 and STIX 2 parser components maintained per-document state that was not completely cleared between conversions. In the STIX 2 parser, galaxy and galaxy-cluster information, including custom galaxy clusters, could survive a parser reset and subsequently be associated with objects from another bundle. The STIX 1 parsers were affected by the same underlying state-management issue. Depending on the parser type, retained information could include galaxies, references, passive DNS bookkeeping, package titles, dates, and timestamps. As a result, parsing a second STIX package with an already-used parser could produce a MISP event containing information that was present only in the previously processed package. For example, a generated event could inherit passive DNS records from an earlier document, reference unrelated galaxy information, combine titles from different packages, or use timestamps originating from another conversion. The

  Product

  misp-stix

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

• Aug 21, 2026A denial-of-service vulnerability was identified in misp-stix when processing attacker-controlled STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents.CVE-2026-77755 · Other software · misp · reported by 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8High 8.7

  A denial-of-service vulnerability was identified in misp-stix when processing attacker-controlled STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents. The STIX import code used sys.exit() to handle several parsing and loading failures. Because SystemExit inherits from BaseException rather than Exception, these failures bypassed the exception handlers used by callers of the library. As a result, a malformed STIX document could terminate a long-running importer process instead of returning a recoverable parsing error. Additionally, no limit was imposed on the size of STIX documents before parsing. A submitted document was therefore read and materialised in memory before its validity or type was evaluated. Depending on the document and parsing path, processing could consume approximately two to seven times the input size in memory, allowing a sufficiently large STIX document to cause excessive memory and CPU consumption and potentially terminate or severely degrade the importing service. An attacker able to provide STIX content to a MISP-STIX import workflow could exploit either condition to affect availability. A malformed document could cause abnormal process termination through an uncaught SystemExit, w

  Product

  misp-stix

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

• Aug 21, 2026A path traversal vulnerability existed in the handling of MISP object template names during STIX 2 import and MISP-to-STIX 2 export.CVE-2026-77751 · Other software · misp · reported by 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8High 8.8

  A path traversal vulnerability existed in the handling of MISP object template names during STIX 2 import and MISP-to-STIX 2 export. MISP object names are passed to PyMISP's object-template resolution mechanism, which constructs a filesystem path by joining the configured MISP object-template directory, the object name, and definition.json. An object name originating from untrusted STIX or MISP content was not sufficiently restricted before being used in this filesystem path. An attacker able to supply a crafted object name containing path separators or traversal sequences such as ../ could therefore cause template resolution to escape the expected template directory and attempt to load a definition.json file from another location accessible to the process. During STIX 2 import, an attacker-controlled x_misp_name from a custom STIX object could directly reach this template-resolution mechanism. The issue could also become persistent. A malicious object name stored in a MISP event could later be processed again during STIX 2 export. Consequently, content originally introduced in one security context could trigger filesystem access later when the event is exported by a process op

  Product

  misp-stix

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

• Aug 21, 2026A vulnerability in misp-stix could allow a crafted STIX document to influence security-sensitive MISP attribute metadata during import.CVE-2026-77710 · Other software · MISP · reported by 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8Medium 6.9

  A vulnerability in misp-stix could allow a crafted STIX document to influence security-sensitive MISP attribute metadata during import. The STIX import logic automatically selected between the internal MISP parser and the external STIX parser based on metadata contained in the STIX document itself. For STIX2, the presence of MISP-specific tool labels could cause a document to be classified as originating from MISP; similarly, STIX1 relied on the document title. These classification indicators are fully controlled by the STIX producer and therefore cannot constitute a trusted indication of the document's origin. The accompanying fix explicitly notes that the parser choice was previously based solely on labels or header titles that any producer could write, and introduces an explicit classification parameter allowing callers to override this detection. When STIX2 content was handled as an internal MISP export, attributes contained in an x-misp-object were converted by copying the complete x_misp_attributes dictionary and passing it directly to misp_object.add_attribute(). Consequently, a crafted STIX bundle could supply fields that were not part of the expected STIX-to-MISP round-t

  Product

  misp-stix

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.