Vulnerability database
Every flaw the U.S. government’s cybersecurity agency (CISA) has confirmed attackers are using, plus the new WordPress plugin and theme bugs published each day, sorted by what they mean for a small business. We refresh it twice a day. If you see something your website or office runs, tell us.
3 results
Oct 1, 2026The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so tCVE-2026-68496 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542cHigh 7.5
The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxN
- Product
- jackson-dataformats-binary
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Oct 1, 2026The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so thCVE-2026-68495 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542cHigh 7.5
The CBOR parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. CBORParser._decodeLongerName() decodes a definite-length property name with no length check, and CBORParser._decodeChunkedName() delegates to the value-oriented _finishChunkedText() routine, which validates maxStringLength rather than maxNameLength. An attacker who can have a CBOR document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach CBORFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the CBOR module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforc
- Product
- jackson-dataformats-binary
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Feb 18, 2021This affects the package com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson-dataformat-cbor from 0 and before 2.11.4, from 2.12.0-rc1 and before 2.12.1.CVE-2020-28491 · Other software · Fasterxml · reported by report@snyk.ioHigh 7.5
This affects the package com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson-dataformat-cbor from 0 and before 2.11.4, from 2.12.0-rc1 and before 2.12.1. Unchecked allocation of byte buffer can cause a java.lang.OutOfMemoryError exception.
- Product
- Jackson-dataformats-binary
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.
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