Vulnerability database

2 results

• Sep 7, 2026Protocol::HTTP2 versions before 1.14 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via closed streams that stream_state never removes from the connection stream table.CVE-2026-16028 · Other software · reported by 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441eHigh 7.5

  Protocol::HTTP2 versions before 1.14 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via closed streams that stream_state never removes from the connection stream table. When a stream reaches the CLOSED state, stream_state returns the concurrency slot and clears most of the stream's keys, but the entry itself stays in the connection stream table and nothing in the distribution removes it. Stream identifiers increase monotonically, so a peer can open and close streams on one connection indefinitely, each close leaving a residual entry that is retained for the life of the connection. SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS does not bound this. That setting caps how many streams are live at once and is enforced, while the growth is made of streams the cap has already released, so it accumulates with concurrency never exceeding one. The client keeps the same table and grows the same way against a hostile server. Measured against a server built on this module, roughly 920 bytes are retained per closed stream for about 19 bytes on the wire, so 100,000 sequential streams on one connection grow server resident memory by about 88 MiB. The streams are ordinary requests that the application accepts and completes

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.commetacpan.org

• Jun 6, 2026Protocol::HTTP2 versions before 1.13 for Perl is vulnerable to a HTTP/2 Bomb.CVE-2026-10725 · Other software · CRUX · reported by 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441eHigh 7.5

  Protocol::HTTP2 versions before 1.13 for Perl is vulnerable to a HTTP/2 Bomb. Protocol::HTTP2's inbound HPACK path has no header-list size limit, so a small HTTP/2 request can expand into large server memory (the "HTTP/2 bomb"). The headers_decode method materialises a full key+value copy per indexed reference with no running size check, and the stream_header_block_add method appends (since version 1.12) every CONTINUATION frame to the per-stream buffer unbounded. MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE (default 65536) is advertised in SETTINGS but never consulted on decode. It is absent from the decoder and from the :limits export tag.

  Product

  Protocol::HTTP2

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.commetacpan.org

Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.